The Freedom of Little Joe Cartwright: Tax Crime, Edgar Allan Poe, Noir Film and Lacrosse

Notes for the week.

Prosecuting Individuals

Federal criminal tax lawyer Jack Townsend blogs at Federal Tax Crimes.  Here is his note on Prosecuting Corporate Employees, particularly in the tax context:

I have previously blogged on Professor Brandon Garrett (UVA Law) who have carved out an academic niche on how the Government deals with corporate crime, particularly large corporate crime (the too big to jail group). See e.g., Judge Jed Rakoff Reviews Brandon Garrett’s Book on Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise with Corporations (Federal Tax Crimes Blog 2/10/15), here. At the risk of oversimplifying his arguments, I summarize them in part relevant to this blog entry: When the Government goes after corporate misconduct, it too often focuses only on the corporation in terms of criminal sanctions and not the individuals, particularly those higher up the chain, who committed the underlying conduct. Corporations cannot go to jail; individuals can. Prosecuting and convicting individuals in addition to corporations could, he thinks, provide more front-end incentive for individuals to forego illegal conduct within the corporations. However, as fans of tax crimes know at least anecdotally, it is hard to convict higher level corporate officers for conduct that their underlings actually commit. The poster child example is the acquittal of Raoul Weil, a high-level UBS banker who “remoted” himself from the dirty work of actually servicing U.S. taxpayers seeking to evade U.S. tax. See e.g., Raoul Weil Found Not Guilty (Federal Tax Crimes 11/3/14; 11/6/14).

Mr. Townsend goes on to discuss the DOJ’s Yates Memorandum and new work by University of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett.  Professor Garrett’s website (Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements) is the best compendium of deferred-prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.

Michael Landon ("Little Joe Cartwright") being served with a subpoena (1968)

Michael Landon (“Little Joe Cartwright”) being served with a subpoena (1968)

Another useful Townsend post addresses a common issue — the Government’s attempt to muzzle the recipients of subpoenas:

In United States v. Gigliotti, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS _____ (ED NY 12/23/15), here, Judge Dearie denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to grand jury subpoena that unlawfully contained the following:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED NOT TO DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS SUBPOENA, AS IT MAY IMPEDE AN ONGOING INVESTIGATION.

Sound familiar?  Read the entire piece at Judge Criticizes Prosecutor’s Use of Language Directing Secrecy for Receipt of Grand Jury Subpoena.  We have written about the grand jury previously herehere and here.  If you are to young (or too old) to remember Bonanza on TV, here is a refresher.  Here is an episode from 1960 entitled — appropriately, for White Collar Wire readers — “Desert Justice”:

Head-on-a-platter and all that.

Head-on-a-platter and all that.

Or Not Prosecuting Individuals?

White Collar Wire should have sent a Christmas goose to Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), who wants more white-collar types to get indicted: 2015 Spurred Billions in Bank Fines, But Not Enough for Warren.  In particular:

In a 10-page report titled “Rigged Justice: 2016,” the U.S. Senator’s staff cited 20 cases in which they say prosecutors showed “timidity” by not pursuing individuals for civil or criminal misdeeds. No executives at Citigroup Inc., JPMorgan Chase & Co., or Deutsche Bank AG were accused of wrongdoing in cases alleging rigged currency markets and the misleading of investors, her office wrote in the document released Friday. The investigations led to their companies paying billions of dollars in penalties.

Senator Warren will have none of the Yates Memo, thank you:

The report even dismisses a recent U.S. Justice Department announcement, known as the Yates memo, in which Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates heralded a new direction by telling prosecutors to embark on investigations by focusing on people, not companies. “Both before and after this DOJ announcement, accountability for corporate crimes has been shockingly weak,” Warren’s office wrote.

“Shocking to whom” is a good question, but it’s all good for the white-collar bar.  Here is her report.

Good Practices and Bad

A miscalculated penalty, perhaps.

A miscalculated penalty, perhaps.

From the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation and Jon Eisenberg, a partner in the Government Enforcement practice at K&L Gates LLP, here is a useful article (with cases and charts) about the SEC’s use of civil monetary penalties.  Tellingly, and sadly, the authors point out that “these decisions might not survive appellate scrutiny . . .  but very few respondents appeal their sanctions all the way to the D.C. Circuit.”

 

 

Hall monitor?

Hall monitor?

Deferred-prosecution agreements often impose corporate monitors.  Should the reports of such monitors be kept confidential?  A federal judge ordered the release of the HSBC monitor’s report, over the object of both HSBC and DOJ:

A federal judge has ordered the release of a report detailing how well HSBC Holdings Plc has complied with anti-money laundering requirements imposed by U.S. regulators when the British bank was fined $1.92 billion three years ago.

Thursday’s order by U.S. District Judge John Gleeson in Brooklyn is a defeat for HSBC and the U.S. Department of Justice, which complained the release could make it easier to launder money, including for terrorism, and discourage cooperation with law enforcement.

“This case implicates matters of great public concern and is therefore one which the public has an interest in overseeing,” Gleeson wrote, citing the public’s constitutional right of access under the First Amendment.

I cannot speak to the terrorism angle, but cooperation (and thus, monitoring) both work best when company employees have some comfort that what they say and do will be held in confidence, at least within reasonable parameters.  The public’s oversight interest is real, but surely an organization that has paid billions in fines and is living with a monitor is being “overseen” to a reasonable extent, especially when that oversight requires continued cooperation to be effective.

Read the entire article here: HSBC money laundering report must be made public.  To read our earlier posts about DPAs and monitors, go herehere, and here.

Crime Fiction

Digital content, quoth the raven.

Digital content, quoth the raven.

From the good folks at The Rap Sheet, a piece on the nominees for the 2016 Edgar Awards.  Here is the complete list from the Mystery Writers of America.

Thomas Hardy (1840-1928)

Thomas Hardy (1840-1928)

It is not a raven, but there is a bird in  Thomas Hardy’s poem “The Darkling Thrush”:

I leant upon a coppice gate
When Frost was spectre-grey,
And Winter’s dregs made desolate
The weakening eye of day.
The tangled bine-stems scored the sky
Like strings of broken lyres,
And all mankind that haunted nigh
Had sought their household fires.

The land’s sharp features seemed to be
The Century’s corpse outleant,
His crypt the cloudy canopy,
The wind his death-lament.
The ancient pulse of germ and birth
Was shrunken hard and dry,
And every spirit upon earth
Seemed fervourless as I.

At once a voice arose among
The bleak twigs overhead
In a full-hearted evensong
Of joy illimited;
An aged thrush, frail, gaunt, and small,
In blast-beruffled plume,
Had chosen thus to fling his soul
Upon the growing gloom.

So little cause for carolings
Of such ecstatic sound
Was written on terrestrial things
Afar or nigh around,
That I could think there trembled through
His happy good-night air
Some blessed Hope, whereof he knew
And I was unaware.

Crime Noir and Miles Davis

It's Miles. It's cool.

It’s Miles. It’s cool.

On the subject of crime, Apple Music must have intuited that I like noir-ish fiction and cool jazz.  It directed to me a set of Miles Davis that included “Ascenseur pour l’echafaud” (1958), a French crime film by Louis Malle released in the States as Elevator To The Scaffold (or Lift To The Scaffold in the U.K.)  Davis’s horn on the title track is as evocative as it gets, as seen here:

 

ESPN's 30-for-30

ESPN’s 30-for-30

Wishing It Were Fiction: Duke Lacrosse and Due Process

On Sunday, March 13, at 9 p.m. ET, ESPN’s acclaimed “30 for 30” film series will present Fantastic Lies, a film about the the Duke lacrosse case.  Here is an interview with the producer, Marina Zenovich.

Damage done.

Damage done.

We have written about the Duke lacrosse case before, here and here.

 

Depends on how we sell it.

Depends on how we sell it.

In opening statements and closing arguments, the genuine is good.  The cornball or the obscure, on the other hand, are bad.  The same is true of our written work.  As noted by Philip Corbett, master of the After Deadline blog in the New York Times:

[A]n overreliance on anecdotal openings — especially the classic “stranger in the lead” approach — can make our prose feel shopworn rather than vivid. This is particularly true when readers encounter unfamiliar names at the top of two or more adjacent stories, whether in print or online.

 

Read the entire piece: Here’s Someone You Never Heard of. Read On.

 


The Yates Memo and Three Dog Night

Deputy Attorney General Yates

Deputy Attorney General Yates

Unless you have been on a monastic retreat or hidden as carefully as Hillary Clinton’s email server, you have by now likely read reports and analyses of the “Yates Memorandum,” a policy document issued by Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates entitled “Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing.”

(Here is the document:  Yates-Memo-Prosecution-of-Individuals.pdf ).

In this essay, I focus on one particular aspect that may be crucial for companies, their boards of directors, their audit committees and law department: The timing of potential disclosures to the Government and the degree to which outside counsel needs to have comfort that what he or she is relating to the Government on the company’s behalf is more or less reliable.

The Yates Memo sets out six principles that the Department of Justice intends to apply in a renewed (or apparently renewed) emphasis on the prosecution of individuals in the context of the investigation of corporate wrongdoing.

The key summary paragraph is as follows:

The guidance in this memo reflects six key steps to strengthen our pursuit of individual corporate wrongdoing, some of which reflect policy shifts and each of which is described in greater detail below: (1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit, corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct; (2) criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on individuals from the inception of the investigation; (3) criminal and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in routine communication with one another; (4) absent extraordinary circumstances or approved departmental policy, the Department will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability when resolving a matter with a corporation; (5) Department attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation without a clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should memorialize any declinations as to individuals in such cases; and (6) civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well as the company and evaluate whether to bring suit against an individual based on considerations beyond that individual’s ability to pay.

There has been considerable criticism of DOJ from politicians, editorialists and judges (see the Southern District of New York’s Judge Jed Rakoff here and a note here and here about Judge William H. Pauley) over the paucity of individual prosecutions arising from the financial crisis.  Assuming that the memorandum is more than a simple public relations effort to deflect that criticism, a number of points come to mind.

Difficult to keep calm, actually.

Difficult to keep calm, actually.

First, if implemented, the Yates Memo will cause more corporate officers and employees to lawyer up, and lawyer up earlier, then at any time since the savings and loan crisis.  As a white-collar and internal-investigations lawyer with looming college tuition to pay for, I have no objection to such an outcome, but it may actually make getting the facts out of an internal investigation more difficult, not less.

Second, the renewed focus on facts pertaining to individuals will potentially make it very uncomfortable for boards of directors, audit committees, chief legal officers and other decision-makers who will more frequently be tempted to throw company officers and employees under the bus than previously.  To cite Three Dog Night from their eponymous 1969 album, “one is the loneliest number.”

Third, although DOJ officials in speeches have said repeatedly that they are not trying to force corporate outside counsel to be police officers, there is more than a whiff of that impulse in the Yates Memo.  Such an approach raises multiple potential conflict of interest problems.

Civil discovery.  Criminal facts?

Civil discovery. Criminal facts?

Fourth, the focus on individual wrongdoing (and disclosure of facts relating to individual wrongdoing) is to apply equally in the civil arena. Companies and businesspeople have far more civil problems then criminal.  The ultimate effect of the Yates Memo may be felt most dangerously (and most expensively) in the civil context.

Fifth, it is unclear (at least to me) whether and to what extent the Yates Memo will require outside counsel conducting an internal investigation to modify a standard Upjohn instruction.  (We have previously discussed Upjohn warnings in these posts).  In other words, does company counsel need to add an explicit statement that, should the witness reveal facts about himself or herself that appear to be a reasonable basis of criminal liability (theirs or the company’s), the lawyer will probably tote those facts over to the Government?

As a practical matter for corporations and those who guide and advise them, as well as for lawyers who represent individual officers and employees, the most delicate task will be trying to figure out at what point in time does one pull the disclosure trigger with regard to evidence of individual wrongdoing.

In other words, when do you know what it is that you know? And, what if you make your early or premature disclosure to the Government but you are wrong?

Off to college? Or, to a meeting at the U.S. Attorney's Office?

Off to college? Or, to a meeting at the U.S. Attorney’s Office?

As I write this, my daughter is a high school senior in the midst of college applications.  These applications come at the tail end of a lengthy period of campus visits, alumni interviews, webpage reading and prayer.  We have been diligent, and the process by turns exhilarating, disappointing and expensive.

What struck me is how different things look now than when we began.  At some point, one must “land the plane” – that is, make a decision – whether one is in the midst of a college search process or an internal corporate investigation.  Yet, had my daughter been forced to apply very early in the process to, say, what were her top five choices then, we would have been in an artificially different (and most likely more disadvantageous) situation from the one in which we find ourselves today.

The Yates Memo will put boards of directors, audit committees and chief legal officers is in a similar position of having to make a call unnaturally early in an internal investigation in hopes of reaping the harvest of cooperation.  As most anyone who is been through an internal investigation can attest, the factual landscape and legal conclusions are often different (but more accurate) late in the day.  The next months and years under the Yates Memo will tell, but it would be a shame if, in order to grasp at cooperation’s life jacket, American businesses and their legal advisers are put in a situation that helps neither the legitimate aims of Government prosecutions nor those companies’ shareholders and stakeholders.

SIDEBAR: In the context of governmental policy, it is easy to talk about the prosecution of individuals without putting a face (and a life) to a name.  With faceless defendants, we sometimes forget what investigations and trials can do to individuals and their families.

Tom Hayes and wife Sarah Tighe

Tom Hayes and wife Sarah Tighe

In this five-part series in the Wall Street Journal, David Enrich lays out the prosecution of LIBOR trader Tom Hayes.  “The Unraveling of Tom Hayes” bears a careful read.

 


White-Collar Crime, DPAs and Repeat Business

Trying to keep your balance in a DPA.

Trying to keep your balance in a DPA.

The phenomenon of extending corporate deferred-prosecution agreements (or “DPAs”) continues, as here with medical device maker Biomet, and controversy inevitably ensues:

Life was supposed to return to normal for Biomet, the giant medical devices manufacturer accused of foreign bribery, when its federal probation expired next week. But on Tuesday, Biomet disclosed that prosecutors would extend its probation another year as they investigate new evidence of wrongdoing at the company, the Justice Department’s latest attempt to stem a widening pattern of corporate recidivism.

The Department of Justice, however, has been clear recently:

“Make no mistake: The criminal division will not hesitate to tear up a D.P.A. or N.P.A. and file criminal charges where such action is appropriate and proportional to the breach,” Leslie R. Caldwell, head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, said in a speech on Monday. “Just like an individual on probation faces a range of potential consequences for a violation, so, too, does a bank that is subject to a D.P.A.”

In the speech, Ms. Caldwell outlined her policy on repeat offenders in significant new detail. Noting that “we have a range of tools at our disposal,” she said the Justice Department could extend the term of a deferred-prosecution agreement while prosecutors investigate “allegations of new criminal conduct.” And when a breach has occurred, she said, “we can impose an additional monetary penalty” and “most significantly, we can pursue charges based on the conduct covered by the agreement itself — the very conduct that the bank had tried to resolve.”

We have written about DPAs and non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) here.

Builds wrist strength.

Builds wrist strength.

Note the reference to “a widening pattern of corporate recidivism.”  There may be such a pattern, and there are startling cases from  time to time, but hard data is scarce.  Anecdotally, we see few repeat white-collar customers on a significant scale, and for not unexpected reasons — cost, reputation and damage to stock price being the most common.


Need to Know | Nuts-and-Bolts of The Toyota Deferred-Prosecution Agreement

Toyota logoFrom the Wall Street Journal‘s law blog (@WSJLaw and @jacobgershman), here is a good summary of the Highlights from Toyota’s Deferred Prosecution Agreement With Prosecutors.  Note that the agreement provides, as is common, for the appointment of an independent monitor, and the scope of the monitor’s review-authority seems quite broad.  (Perhaps the Government had in mind Apple’s recent battles with its monitor).

Beware of Greeks and corporate monitors bearing gifts.

Beware of Greeks and corporate monitors bearing gifts.

Here is a copy of the Toyota deferred prosecution agreement.

For further reading about the benefits and burdens of DPAs, we’ve discussed them before: White Collar Wire on deferred prosecution agreements


Confidentiality and Transparency in Deferred Prosecution Agreements

"Transparency" or "Opacity"?

“Transparency” or “Opacity”?

Here’s a note about.DOJ Transparency In Deferred Prosecution Agreements

Professor Podgor argues:

It is hard to believe that someone would have to file a lawsuit to obtain information about a non-prosecution agreement of a corporation.  One can understand the need to protect individuals from the sting of criminality when an agreement is reached to defer a prosecution or when an individual is being spared a prosecution as an alternative method to rehabilitate that individual.  But corporations are not afforded the same rights as individuals. The government is quick to note that corporations do not have the same rights as individuals when they are trying to obtain corporate documents. 

Fair enough, and “transparency” is supposed to be better than “opacity,” but is the question about NPAs and DPAs really one of “rights”?  Such agreements are the result of horse-trading and power plays.  A company (unlike an individual) may have to worry about private plaintiffs and other follow-on litigation.  Depending on the situation, the confidentiality of the factual basis for the agreement may be the quid pro quo for the company entering into negotiations at all.  In other words, if the collateral damage from disclosure is potentially greater than the cost and risk of litigating, then the company may force the Government to litigate (or cave).

At the Old Bailey

At the Old Bailey

As a white-collar lawyer who like trials, I like that latter option, but I’m not sure it’s in the best interests either of American businesses or efficient investigations and prosecutions.

Here’s the website mentioned in the BLT article:  Brandon L. Garrett and Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements, University of Virginia School of Law, at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/home.suphp.


Deferred Prosecution Agreements and the Individual

http://www.epicurusinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/SEC-Bldg.jpg

The first SEC deferred-prosecution agreement for an individual raises a couple of issues.  Here is the document itself:  SEC DPA With Herckis

First, a reminder.  A “deferred prosecution agreement” is what its name implies.  It’s an agreement between a company (and now, an individual) that puts off — for good, hopefully — prosecution on the condition that the defendant/respondent complete a certain course of action laid out in the agreement (for example, hiring an independent corporate monitor or auditor who will report to the government).

Second, there is guidance on DPAs in the United States Attorney’s Manual.  Review the 2010 Grindler Memorandum, which is an amendment to the 2008 Morford Memorandum.  The Morford Memorandum focuses on selection criteria for a corporate monitor.  From the introduction:

The Department of Justice’s commitment to deterring and preventing corporate crime remains a high priority. The Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations set forth guidance to federal prosecutors regarding charges against corporations. A careful consideration of those principles and the facts in a given case may result in a decision to negotiate an agreement to resolve a criminal case against a corporation without a formal conviction—either a deferred prosecution agreement or a non-prosecution agreement. As part of some negotiated corporate agreements, there have been provisions pertaining to an independent corporate monitor. The corporation benefits from expertise in the area of corporate compliance from an independent third party. The corporation, its shareholders, employees and the public at large then benefit from reduced recidivism of corporate crime and the protection of the integrity of the marketplace.

The purpose of this memorandum is to present a series of principles for drafting provisions pertaining to the use of monitors in connection with deferred prosecution and non- prosecution agreements (hereafter referred to collectively as “agreements”) with corporations. Given the varying facts and circumstances of each case—where different industries, corporate size and structure, and other considerations may be at issue—any guidance regarding monitors must be practical and flexible. This guidance is limited to monitors, and does not apply to third parties, whatever their titles, retained to act as receivers, trustees, or perform other functions.

A monitor’s primary responsibility is to assess and monitor a corporation’s compliance with the terms of the agreement specifically designed to address and reduce the risk of recurrence of the corporation’s misconduct, and not to further punitive goals. A monitor should only be used where appropriate given the facts and circumstances of a particular matter. For example, it may be appropriate to use a monitor where a company does not have an effective internal compliance program, or where it needs to establish necessary internal controls. Conversely, in a situation where a company has ceased operations in the area where the criminal misconduct occurred, a monitor may not be necessary.In negotiating agreements with corporations, prosecutors should be mindful of both: (1) the potential benefits that employing a monitor may have for the corporation and the public, and (2) the cost of a monitor and its impact on the operations of a corporation. Prosecutors shall, at a minimum, notify the appropriate United States Attorney or Department Component Head prior to the execution of an agreement that includes a corporate monitor. The appropriate United States Attorney or Department Component Head shall, in turn, provide a copy of the agreement to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at a reasonable time after it has been executed. The Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division shall maintain a record of all such agreements.

 

Gavel and cash

Third, in general, DPAs are workable ( Podgor, Deferred Prosecution Agreements – Definitely A Plus ) but  they can be wildly expensive for defendants/respondents because the Government has the whip hand, usually (Washington Legal Foundation, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements).

 

Monopoly

Fourth, it will be fascinating to watch the development (or not) of DPAs for individuals.  For the Government, of course, the motherlode in an individual’s DPA will be the value of his or her cooperation (in Herckis’s case, for five years).  The Government gets to avoid the risk of trial; locks the individual into an acceptance of responsibility and a statement of facts; and gets his cooperation in “related” proceedings.